Abstract -To determine risk of an electric shock to firefighter personnel due to contact with live parts of a damaged PV system, simulated PV arrays were constructed with multiple "modules" connected to a central inverter. The results of this analysis demonstrate that ungrounded arrays are significantly safer than grounded arrays for reasonable module isolation resistances. Ungrounded arrays provide current hazards to personnel up to three orders of magnitude smaller than for a grounded array counterpart. While the size of the array does not affect the current hazard in grounded arrays for body resistances above 100 W, in ungrounded arrays, increased array size yields increased current hazards -considering that the overall fault current level is still significantly smaller than for grounded arrays. In both grounded and ungrounded arrays, the current hazard has a direct correlation to array voltage. Since the level of fault current in a grounded array can be significant, this work shows that the nonlinearity of the array IV curve must be taken into account for body resistances below 600 W and array voltages above 1000V for accurate fault current determination. Although module and array isolation resistance is not a factor that modulates fault current in a grounded array, this resistance, Riso, has a significant effect on current hazard to the firefighter for ungrounded arrays.
I. SIMULATION MODEL
To determine risk of an electric shock to firefighter personnel due to contact with live parts of a PV system, simulated PV arrays were constructed with multiple "modules" connected to a central inverter. These simulations and an explanation of their results with the supporting theory are described herein.
The electrical characteristics of PV modules are non-linear, ranging continuously from low-voltage, high current to highvoltage, low current. Either condition carries the potential for energy or shock hazards to personnel. To accommodate an efficient study of hazard scenarios, this work chose to simulate the electrical characteristics using a one-diode equivalent circuit for a PV system under a wide variety of fault conditions [1] . SPICE, or Simulation Program with Integrated Circuit Emphasis is commonly used for general circuit simulation and was originally developed at the University of California, Berkeley Electronics Research Laboratory in 1973 [2] . This general-purpose, open source, analog circuit simulator has several derivatives, such as MacSPICE, which was used in this study to analyze the behavior of PV systems in various array configurations and ground-fault conditions [3] .
The one-diode MacSPICE model of a PV module consists of an ideal current source (I sc) in parallel with a diode and shunt resistance (Rsh) and in series with a resistance (Rs). In order to increase the Voc of the module above the voltage drop of a regular diode (~0.6 V), the ideality constant of the diode was increased [4] .
Specific parameters were selected to approximate the Sanyo Power HIT Module located at Sandia's Distributed Energy Technology Laboratory (DETL) and has been validated in previous work [5] . The current source is set to supply 2.5 A at short circuit and the diode has an ideality factor of N=79.60. The shunt resistance is set to 0.5 MW and series resistance is set to 10 mW. This model produces a module IV curve with I sc of 2.5A, Voc of 55.8 V, and Pmp of 118 W. The maximum power point has a current of Imp=2.41 A and a voltage of Vmp=49.7 V.
To determine the danger to firefighter personnel from a fault, an array model was created consisting of a combination of simulated PV modules connected in variable series and parallel connections that could be altered as desired. Each module was connected to a bypass diode (Isat=4.7•10-12 A, N=1). The module model also contained a leakage pathway to ground which can be varied as needed. To simulate the available fault current a firefighter could be exposed to during PV system operation, a ground pathway, represented by the firefighter resistance was placed between the ungrounded current carrying conductor and ground. This places the firefighter resistance between the nominally ungrounded current carrying conductor and ground, representing the highest voltage gradient in the array and, therefore, the maximum current flow through the firefighter.
II. THEORETICAL MODEL
The effective resistance, Reff, of the firefighter/PV system determines the load line and thus sets the current output from the array. If Reff >> Rmp array and the array has a moderate fill factor, then it can be assumed that Reff intersects the array IV curve approximately at array Voc. In this case, the current hazard, IFF can be described by (1) and gives a worst-case current hazard to the firefighter.
(
This approximation is more appropriate for larger values of Reff. As Reff approaches array Rmp, the curvature of the array IV curve can no longer be ignored and the intersection of Reff with the IV curve cannot be approximated as Voc.
A. Ungrounded Arrays
For an ungrounded array with the inverter disconnected from the path of current flow, the fault current path through the firefighter (RFF) is in series with the array isolation resistance, Riso (Fig. 1) . Therefore, a large Riso restricts the amount of current flow through the firefighter (IFF). Since Riso and RFF are in series, the effective impedance of the pathway is equal to Equation (2).
(2)
B. Grounded Arrays
A grounded array, on the other hand, is not disconnected from ground at the inverter. This means that the array is referenced to ground both along the module leakage pathway (Rleak) as well as via the grounded current carrying conductor. In this case, the effective system resistance, Reff, is a combination of the parallel module pathways to ground due to Riso as well as RFF.
In this configuration, the firefighter body impedance, RFF, is in parallel with Riso. This is compared to the ungrounded case, when the firefighter body impedance is in series with Ris. Since RFF and Riso offer parallel current pathways, a fraction of the fault current (F) flows through RFF with the remainder flowing through Rsio. However, typically Riso >> RFF and F~1. In this grounded case, the effective impedance of the system is equal to (3).
As Riso >> RFF, (3) reduces to (4) . (4) III. RESULTS
A. Array Size
To investigate the effect of array size on firefighter hazard, different array configurations of modules in series and parallel were simulated. The module leakage values (Rmodule) for the ungrounded array were chosen to be 7 MW per module (1 MW per string). This is considered reasonably conservative on the basis that modules undergoing durability testing according to the IEC 61215 series of standards [6] must maintain an electrical isolation resistance of 40 MW/m 2 post-stress, or approximately 20 MW per typical 2 m 2 module. Therefore, the results listed here given an additional safety factor above what would be expected for newly qualified modules and may describe modules with degraded Riso that may be encountered by firefighters in the field.
A grounded array of seven modules in series was simulated in arrays of different number of strings in parallel ranging from 0.826 kW (single string) to 82.6 kW (100 strings). The results shown in Fig. 4 show current hazard to the firefighter as a function of firefighter resistance. For any resistance above 600 W, the size of the array has no effect on the amount of current hazard to the firefighter. Colored curves show simulated data while black triangles indicate calculated points using (1) and (2) . The calculated results match well for body impedances larger than 600 W.
The reason for the insensitivity of firefighter hazard to grounded array size (in number of parallel strings) is shown in , then the array size has no effect on the current hazard to a firefighter.
Ungrounded systems have orders of magnitude smaller current hazard than grounded systems. Fig. 6 shows the current hazard to a firefighter for different sized ungrounded arrays as a function of body impedance (note the scale difference between Fig. 4 and Fig. 6 ) . This is due to that fact that array isolation from ground is in parallel to the firefighter in the grounded case, as shown in Fig. 3 , but in series with the firefighter in the ungrounded case. The additional resistance in series with the firefighter significantly reduces current hazard.
The ungrounded array does show an increase in current hazard as array size increases (the current hazard increases linearly for a given body impedance), unlike the grounded case, which shows no relationship between current hazard and array size. This is due to the fact that increases in array size add more parallel pathways to ground, thereby decreasing Riso. This decrease in Riso has a direct impact on current flow in the ungrounded case (due to the series relationship between Riso and RFF) but little impact on the current flow in the grounded case (due to the parallel nature of Riso and RFF, which means that decreases in Riso do not significantly affect IFF for moderate values of Riso)
B. Array Voc
There has been a motivation in the PV industry to move to higher values of array Voc in order to reduce ohmic transmission losses. While 600 V has traditionally been the limit for installed PV systems, recent history has seen a number of arrays with open circuit voltages of 1000 V and there has been discussion on moving towards 1500 V arrays.
To investigate firefighter hazard as a function of array voltage, arrays of a single string was simulated with a number of modules in series to form an array Voc with values ranging from 55.8 V (single module) to 1506.6 V (27 modules in series).
The results shown in Fig. 7 show current hazard to the firefighter as a function of array Voc for a firefighter body impedance of 600 W. Unlike the addition of parallel strings, there is an increase in current hazard to the firefighter as array Voc increases for both grounded and ungrounded arrays. However, this effect is most pronounced for arrays with small Voc and the increase in current hazard per volt is low for high Voc arrays. Increases in array Voc increase the current hazard to firefighter personnel because the resultant current at the intersection of the load line (Reff) and the array IV curve increases with increasing array Voc, as shown in Fig. 8 . For small values of body resistance and large array Voc, the value of Reff may even begin to approach Rmp array . Fig. 4 . Current hazard to firefighter for a grounded array as a function of array size and firefighter impedance. As in the previous section, ungrounded arrays significantly decrease the current hazard to firefighter personnel. For high Voc arrays (Voc > 1000 V), ungrounded array have a decreased current hazard of three orders of magnitude compared to the grounded arrays (from 2,340 to 3.12 mA). At 7 MW per module, Riso ranges from 7 MW for a single module to 250 kW for an array with a Voc of 1506.6 V.
C. Array Isolation
In a grounded array, changes in Riso have little effect on the current hazard to a firefighter (note that scale is logarithmic). This is due to the fact that Reff and Riso are in parallel (Fig. 3 ) (see Fig. 9 , which simulates the firefighter current for grounded and ungrounded cases as a function of individual module isolation for an array with 50 strings of 10 modules in series and an assumed firefighter resistance of 5 kW).
However, in an ungrounded array, a decrease in Riso would result in an increased current hazard to the firefighter, since RFF and Riso are in series (Fig. 2) and Reff is a function of both Riso and RFF (2) . Therefore, a decrease in array isolation has the direct effect of decreasing Reff and increasing IFF (although the firefighter current in the ungrounded case will always be less than or equal to the current in the grounded case). This direct relationship is retained until the value of Rmodule begins to approach RFF. If Rmodule decreases even further, then the ungrounded model approaches the grounded model (since RFF >> Riso, the current hazard is completely determined by RFF and (2) reduces to (4)).
In the equations presented, it is assumed that the arrays are in good working order, including a consistent distribution of isolation resistance and resulting leakage current across the array. However, other fault pathways besides through the firefighter or via module leakage could be present. The presence of these other fault pathways would decrease the value of Riso.
For normally operating arrays, a number of current PV standards are in effect that prescribe minimum allowable Riso values [7] [8] [9] [10] . The minimum Riso set points for a number of different standards are shown in TABLE I.
Looking at IEC62109-2, the minimum allowable Riso value for an array is related to the rated PV input voltage and is not dependent on array sizing. Utilizing the equation in TABLE I for Vmax = 600, 1000, and 1500 V, the minimum allowable array Riso corresponds to 20, 33.3, and 50 kW, respectively. This would yield current hazards to the firefighter as shown in Fig.  10 . Again, the grounded array configuration (solid lines) have significantly larger current hazards than ungrounded arrays (dashed lines) and higher Voc arrays also result in increased current hazards.
While the array isolation is modeled here as purely resistance-based, in real arrays there exists a significant capacitive component which is related to the size of the module area. This capacitance can be significant in arrays and poses an additional hazard to the firefighter. If we consider an array at Voc with a capacitor tied to ground (Fig. 11) , the capacitor will source a current in order to keep the array voltage at Voc. While the current sourced from the array will remain negligible, current (Icapacitor) will flow from the capacitor through the firefighter in order to maintain the array voltage at Voc. This current will, of course, decay as the array capacitance discharges. If we consider an infinite capacitance, the current from the capacitor will take on a value determined by (5). (5) The level of level of current hazard in equation (5) due to an infinite capacitance is the approximation made in (1) and used as the basis for the theoretical hazard levels. The theoretical calculations presented here already take into account the current hazard from an infinitely large array capacitance.
IV. FIREFIGHTER BODY IMPEDANCES AND CURRENT

HAZARD HEALTH EFFECTS
As defined in IEC TS 60479-1 [12] , many factors can affect body impedance, including:
• Current path Core body impedances are defined in [12] , considering a variety of conditions and the percentage of the population to which they can be assumed to be applicable (5%, 50%, and 95%). For example, a 500 W resistance for 5% of the population at a given condition indicates that 95% of the population will have a body impedance of a value greater than 500 W. Body impedances are also inversely proportional to the touch voltage. Extensive tables provide for variations in AC versus DC, surface area of contact, and degree of moisture of the skin.
When considering array voltages of 600 V and above, most factors are irrelevant, since all tables approach the asymptotic values of 575 Ω for 5% of the population and 775 Ω for 50% of the population. One factor that could further reduce the body impedance is the breakdown of the skin. In order for this to occur, there must be sufficient current density, approximately 50 mA/mm 2 , which depends on the current level and the surface area of contact. Even assuming a small surface area of contact (100 mm 2 ), which would be more prone to skin breakdown for a given current level, skin breakdown would not be a concern even up to 1500 V systems. The impedance/resistance values given in [12] assume a hand-to-hand current path. A "heart-current factor" (HCF) table is provided with factors to compensate for other current paths through the body and their relation to the likelihood of ventricular fibrillation. The likelihood of a firefighter losing his/her footwear or PPE clothing is considered very low and therefore a hand-to-hand path of current is used here for a conservative, but still realistic approach.
While firefighters may have appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE), the condition of those gloves (both long-term damage and short-term condition must be considered. Dry and sweaty wet glove conditions have recently been studied by UL. Conservative values for dry and sweaty wet gloves at array voltages of 600 V and above can be assumed to be on the order of ~20 MΩ and 400 Ω, respectively. This highlights the importance of PPE and its condition.
Sandia recently performed analysis on firefighter current hazards regarding contact with live DC parts using the assumptions for each of the variables described above and with the various array configurations [13] . Typical impedance differences between men and women were also considered. An example table is shown below (TABLE II) for the current hazard for grounded and ungrounded systems for various voltages and PPE conditions for female firefighters in the 5% body impedance level. The array was assumed to have the minimum Riso values allowable by IEC 62109-2, Ed. 1 [9] (See  TABLE I ).
Grounded systems were found to be significantly more hazardous, with potential ventricular fibrillation hazards for bare hand contact and wet glove condition (for 1000, and 1500 Voc). For ungrounded systems, there were no ventricular fibrillation hazards for men or women at any voltage level or PPE. Dry gloves prevented any hazard level for all variable combinations. 
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This work has examined current hazards to firefighters from a PV array using a mixture of SPICE simulations and theory and presuming worst-case contact with live parts. The analysis shows that ungrounded arrays are significantly safer than grounded arrays for reasonable module isolation resistance with fault currents up to three orders of magnitude smaller than a grounded array counterpart. While the size of the array does not affect the current hazard in grounded arrays for body resistances above 100 W, in ungrounded arrays, increased array size yields increased current hazards -again bearing in mind that the overall fault current level is significantly smaller than for grounded arrays. In both grounded and ungrounded arrays, the current hazard has a direct correlation to array voltage. Additionally, conditions of contact (location, duration, PPE condition, etc.) can have a significant effect on the physiological consequences of current hazard to the firefighter.
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